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INTRODUCTION

Obesity, and with it diabetes, are the only major health problems
that are getting worse in this country, and they are getting worse
rapidly.
- Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, Director of the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention'
What's for dinner tonight? A Burger King Triple Whopper With
Cheese and Medium Fries is 1690 calories, 2 a large Quiznos Tuna Melt
is 1740 calories, 3 and Panera's Italian Combo Sandwich alone is 1040
calories. 4 Even a seemingly innocent Buffalo Chicken Salad at Chili's
amounts to over 1000 calories.5 What about dessert? Most people would
probably guess that a slice of Carrot Cake from the Cheesecake Factory
is not healthy, but many people would probably be shocked to learn that
1. Steven Reinberg, Almost Ten Percent of U.S. Medical Costs Tied to Obesity, ABC
NEWS, July 28, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthday/story?id=8184975&page=1.
2. BURGER KING, http://www.bk.com/en/us/menu-nutrition/ index.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2010).
http://www.quiznos.com/subsandwiches/Menu/PDFs/Nutritionlnfo.pdf
3. QuizNos,
(last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
4. PANERA, http://www.www.panerabread.com/pdf/nutr-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2010).
5. CHIU'S, http://www.chilis.com/ENINutrition%20Information/ChilisNutrition Menu
_Generic.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
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a single slice contains over 1500 calories. 6
Obesity is a significant and rapidly growing problem that is largely
preventable and results in many health complications and avertable
deaths. In the United States, two-thirds of adults and almost one-third of
children and teens are currently considered overweight or obese.7
Obesity is related to over 20 chronic diseases, including heart disease
and diabetes. The economic burden of obesity is substantial. Studies
that estimate the annual medical spending due to obesity range from
$92.6 billion (in 2002) to as high as $117 billion.9 According to the
Congressional Budget Office, spending per capita for obese adults
exceeded spending for adults of normal weight by about 8% in 1987
and by about 38% in 2007.10 Another study found that obesity adds over
$2,800 to a person's annual medical bills." Compounding the issue, a
large proportion of the financial burden of obesity and relating
complications falls on taxpayers because the federal government
publically funds medical services for certain populations through
Medicaid, Medicare, and related programs.12
A successful mandatory menu labeling regulatory scheme is one
approach to address the growing obesity problem in the United States.
This Note will analyze federally required calorie disclosures on menus
as one approach to combating obesity, exploring problematic
uncertainties and proposing an alternative framework of regulation. Part
I provides a brief history of nutrient disclosure laws in the context of
federalism choice, analyzing the impact of certain federal floors,
ceilings, and failed legislation. Part I concludes with a discussion of
regulations that states and localities have implemented to address
nutrient disclosure in restaurants. Next, Part II gives an overview of §
4205 of the recently enacted ACA, which mandates calorie disclosures
6. Center for Science in the Public Interest, Anyone's Guess: The Need for Nutrition
Labeling at Fast Food and Other Chain Restaurants, Nov. 2003, http://www.cspinet.orgf
restaurantreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
7. JEFFREY LEVI ET AL., F AS IN FAT; How OBESiTY THREATENS AMERICA'S FUTURE, 4
(2010).
8. Id.
9. Joan R. Rothenberg, In Search of the Silver Bullet: Regulatory Models to Address
Childhood Obesity, 65 FOODDRUGL.J. 185, 188 (2010).
10. Congressional Budget Office, How Does Obesity in Adults Affect Spending on
Health Care?, Sept. 2010, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/docll810/09-08-Obesity brief.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2011).
11. USA Today, Obesity Costs U.S. $186 Billion, Study Finds. Oct. 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/yourlife/fitness/2010-10-18-obesity-costsN.htm. (last visited Jan. 4,
2011).
12. Tamara Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America, 47
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 587, 591 (2010). A 2003 study concluded that approximately one half of
medical expenditures attributed to obesity were financed by Federal and State governments
through Medicare and Medicaid. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., State-Level Estimates of Annual
Medical Expenditures Attributable to Obesity, 12 OBEsITY REs. 18, 18 (2004).
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at certain restaurants, and discusses the FDA's interpretation of
§ 4205's language. Part III discusses concepts of federalism choice and
experimentalism, and then evaluates § 4205 and the potential impacts
and consequences of its ceiling preemption. Finally, Part IV argues that
§ 4205 should be rewritten as a federal minimum standard. In the
alternative, this Note offers suggestions for courts, states, localities,
regulatory agencies, and businesses to combat the obesity epidemic and
address the problems inherent to implementing the statute.

I. A HISTORY OF NUTRIENT

DISCLOSURE LAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF
FEDERALISM CHOICE

Policymakers in the United States have long struggled with the
amount and type of regulation needed regarding food and health. For
example, to combat growing obesity rates throughout the years,
governments at every level have implemented many different policies
and regulations, including total prohibition of transfats, mandating
exercise in schools, and regulating marketing and advertising of food.'
These regulations, however, exist in constant tension with individual
rights and freedoms, because most foods are not inherently dangerous,' 4
and how much a person eats and exercises are considered to be personal
choices.' 5 This tension creates the need for politicians to constantly
balance the strong public policy considerations behind obesity
regulations with these individual liberty concerns. Given that the FDA
bases its nutrition labels on an average daily calorie intake of 2,000
calories, and many restaurant dishes, not just fast food, contain close to
or in excess of that number, it is easy to understand why many public
health advocates and policymakers argue for restaurant disclosure
regulation to address the obesity epidemic in the United States.' 6 Such
advocates believe that with more information, consumers will make
healthier choices, thus reducing their calorie consumption and thereby
reducing obesity.' 7
Americans over the age of eight eat, an average of 218 restaurant
meals per year.' 8 Eating outside the home is a growing trend. In 2006,
13.

Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 194-96, 201.

14.

LAWRENCE A. GOODMAN ET AL., LAW INPUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 413, 2d (2007).

15. Katherine Mayer, Note, An Unjust War: The Case Against The Government's War on
Obesity, 92 GEo. L.J. 999, 1008 (2004).
16. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, How to Understand and Use the Nutrition Facts
Label, http://www.fda.gov/food/labeling nutrition/consumerinformation/ucm078889.htm (last
visited Jan. 7, 2011).
17. Brent Bernell, The History and Impact of the New York City Menu LabelingLaw, 65
FOOD DRUG L.J. 839, 843 (2010).
18. Center for Science in the Public Interest. Anyone's Guess: The Need for Nutrition

2011]

CLOSING THE KITCHEN? DIGESTING THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL MENU LABELING LAW

259

Americans spent 48% of their food dollars on meals outside of their
homes, up from 25% in 1955.19 Restaurant meals are linked to drinking
less milk and the consumption of substantially more calories, more
saturated fat, and fewer fruits and vegetables than eating at home. 2 0
Further, it is common for restaurants to serve portions two to three times
larger than what is considered a standard serving size by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. 2 1 Additionally, studies show that patrons
have a difficult time assessing calorie content in restaurant food,22 and
often underestimate calorie content in restaurant dishes.2 3 Reacting to
this and other information voids, the federal government, as well as
state and local governments have a history of requiring some type of
disclosure on food and drug products.2 4 Section A of this Part first
describes both successful and attempted past federal nutrient disclosure
laws, and their preemptive effects. Section B then discusses state and
local attempts to regulate nutrient disclosure in restaurants, and
subsequent effects.
A.

PastFederalAction

Historically, federal environmental and health rules have served as a
floor of minimum protections, allowing states to enact more stringent
requirements.25 In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which created national food and
drug safet
standards and mandated FDA approval for all marketed drugs.
Interestingly, the FDCA does not contain an express preemption clause
Labelingat Fast Foodand Other ChainRestaurants (2003).
19. National Restaurant Association, 2008 Restaurant Industry Pocket Factbook, www.
restaurant.org/pdfs/research/2008forecast_ factbook.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
20. S.A. French et al., Fast FoodRestaurant Use Among Adolescents. Associations With
Nutrient Intake, Food Choices and Behavioraland Psychosocial Variables, 25 INT'L J. OBESITY,
1823-33 (2001).
21. Center for Science in the Public's Interest, Anyone's Guess: the Need for Nutrition
Labeling at Fast Food and Other Chain Restaurants, Nov. 2003, http://www.cspinet.org/
restaurantreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
22. L.R. Young et al., 53 Portion Sizes in Dietary Assessment: Issues and Policy
Implications, NUTRITION REVS. 149-58 (1995). For a discussion of preemption, see infra Part
III.
23. W.G. Johnson et al., Dietary Restraint and Eating Behavior in the Natural
Environment, 15 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 285-90 (1990). See also Mark Berman & Risa
Lavizzo-Mourey, Obesity Prevention in the Information Age: CalorieInformation at the Point
ofPurchase,300 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 433,433 (2008).
24. Margaret Sova McCabe, Loco Labels and Marketing Madness: Improving How
Consumers Interpret Information in the American Food Economy, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 493, 498
(2009).

25. Nina Mendelson, Bullies Along the Potomac, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2006), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/07/05/opinion/05mendelson.html.
26. Charles R. Yates, III, Note, Trimming the Fat: A Study of Mandatory Nutrition
DisclosureLaws and Excessive JudicialDeference, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 787, 790 (2010).
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that applies to the entire Act, which has sparked years of Supreme Court
*27
litigation.
In contrast to the FDCA, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA) of 1990 contains an express ceiling preemption clause. 28 The
NLEA added two sections to the FDCA, requiring packaged foods sold
in grocery stores to disclose nutrient and calorie content on labels. 29 The
NLEA provides the FDA with a mandate to oversee nutrition labeling
for all food products and review claims on packaging. 30 Further, the
NLEA requires ingredient disclosure on packaged food labels, and
declared that the FDCA preempts most state food labeling laws.31
Accordingly, the NLEA operates as a uniform federal ceiling by not
allowing states and localities to enact laws that differ from the NLEA's
provisions with regard to packaged food labels.
National uniformity helps avoid additional costs resulting from
multiple labeling requirements, facilitating the national distribution of
products. 32 In this situation, ceiling preemption can be viewed in a
positive light because the NLEA takes steps to alleviate information
asymmetries between producers of packaged food and individual
consumers throughout the country. Ceiling preemption, however, does
not leave room for states and localities to enact laws that target the
specific needs of their communities. For example, under the NLEA,
states cannot impose additional requirements for nutrient disclosure on
food packages. Moreover, the NLEA does not include any language
directed at regulating restaurant nutrient disclosure, except when
restaurants make health claims about an item. In fact, the NLEA
expressly exempted restaurants from its nutrition requirements, but did

27. Anthony Gostanian, Note and Article, How the FDA Can Overturn Wyeth v. Levine,
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 248, 252 (2010). See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008);
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). For instance, pharmaceutical regulation under the
FDCA preempts many state and local pharmaceutical laws, based on the rationales that
pharmaceutical products, distributed nationally, would benefit from uniform standards, and that
companies capitalize on economics of scale.
28. "[The Act] shall not be construed to preempt any provision of State law, unless such
provision is expressly preempted [by the NLEA]." 21 U.S.C. § 343-1, note on Construction.
29. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104
Stat. 2352 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)). NLEA amended the 1938 Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act that established a system of "uniform labeling of certain food products in
interstate commerce." Devon E. Winkles, Comment, Weighing the Value of Information: Why
the Federal Government Should Require Nutrition Labelingfor FoodServed in Restaurants,59
EMORY L.J. 549 (2009).

30. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, supra note 29.
31. Schulman, supra note 12, at 592.
32. See Winkles, supra note 29, at 575-76 ("In enacting the NLEA, 'Congress sought to
free manufacturers from . .. fifty or more different labeling requirements and from the threat of
fifty different type lawsuits . .. Congress agreed to preempt most inconsistent state labeling
laws to get the support of the food industry." (citations omitted)).
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not preempt all state laws regarding restaurants.
Thirteen years after the enactment of the NLEA, Representative
Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) introduced the Menu Education and Labeling
Act of 2003 (MEAL Act) which aimed to require restaurants to disclose
nutrition information under the NLEA.3 4 Under the MEAL Act, chain
restaurants would have had to post the total number of calories, grams
of saturated fat and milligrams of sodium next to items on menus, and
vending machines would have to post total calories for each item.3 5 in
support, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) remarked, "we must build
prevention into the very fabric of our society. We must provide
consumers with the tools and the support that they need to make the
healthy choice the right choice." 36
The MEAL Act would not have precluded states from passing more
stringent regulations, thus serving as a federal minimum floor rather
than a unitary ceiling for restaurant nutrient disclosure. 37 While the
MEAL Act would have set minimum uniform standards across the
nation, states and localities would have been free to free to tailor
additional provisions to fit the needs of specific populations and
communities. Many businesses were opposed to the floor preemption in
the MEAL act because of the possibility of a patchwork of inconsistent
regulations throughout the nation.38
Congress never passed the MEAL Act, and in 2008, Senator Tom
Carper (D-DE) and Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) introduced the
Labeling Education and Nutrition Act (LEAN Act) in the Senate. 39 This
bill required a uniform nutrition labeling standard for chains with 20 or
more establishments, thus operating as a federal floor and ceiling. In
contrast to the MEAL Act, the LEAN Act set a low bar for restaurants
to obtain and calculate nutrition analysis of their products by
minimizing penalties for potential noncompliance, and only required
33. Schulman, supra note 12, at 592. However, the Second Circuit found that NLEA
preempted expressly preempted 81.50 because 81.50 applied only to restaurants that voluntarily
published calorie information. See infra note 46.
34. MEAL, H.R. 3895, 110th Cong. (2007).
35. Id.
36.

155 CONG REc S5502, 5522-23.

37. Jodi Schuette Green, Note, Cheeseburger in Paradise?An Analysis of How New
York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health May Reform Our Fast
Food Nation, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 733, 743 (2010). "Nothing in this clause precludes a State or
political subdivision of a State from requiring that a restaurant or similar food establishment
provide nutrition information in addition to that required under this clause." HR 3895, 110th
Cong. (2007).
38. "Restaurants were exempted from the 1990 law, and rightly so, says the National
Restaurant Association, because it wouldn't be practical." Meal Act Seeks Nutrition Labels for
Fast Food, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,102426,00.html (last visited Jan.
3, 2011).
39. Green, supra note 37, at 743; LEAN Act of 2008, S.3575, 110th Cong. (2008).
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calorie disclosure on menus. 4 0 Representative Jim Matheson (D-UT)
introduced the bill to the House of Representatives as a "compromise
effort that will allow consumers to make informed decision," explaining
that localities have enacted "a patchwork of regulation that can be
confusing to the consumer and is burdensome to restaurant chains." 4 1
The LEAN Act was openly supported by the National Restaurant
Association as empowering consumers, although they had previously
argued that menu labeling was unnecessary.4 2 However, mirroring the
fate of its predecessor, the LEAN Act did not pass.43 Accordingly, prior
to the passage of the ACA, the only nutrition regulations faced by
restaurants were those imposed by the NLEA when making claims
about food items; otherwise, restaurants remained exempt from NLEA's
other obligations, leaving regulation to the states."
B. State and Local Actions and Their Effects
Meaningful federal regulation addressing nutrient disclosures on
menus in restaurants was not ultimately successful until states and
localities began to experiment with such laws. In 2006, the New York
City Board of Health adopted Health Code § 81.50, becoming the first
locality to require restaurants to disclose calorie content on menu
boards.4 5 Although the Southern District of New York struck down the
first version of the regulation as reempted by federal law, the Board of
Health re-wrote the regulation. The Second Circuit held that this new
version was acceptable after undertaking a federal preemption and First
Amendment analysis. The revised version requires restaurants with
40.

Green, supra note 37, at 743-44.

41.

155 CONG. REC. E 597.

42. Green, supra note 37, at 744-45.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 33.
45. Green, supra note 37, at 746. The City of New York explained that § 81.50 was
enacted because "There is a calorie information gap.... Providing information about the calorie
content of foods and beverages being served in chain restaurants in a time, place, and manner
that can inform decisions will help bridge this gap." N.Y. City Bd. Of Health, Notice of
Intention to Repeal and Reenact § 81.50 of the New York City Health Code at 8 (Oct. 2007),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-intention-hc-art81-50-1007.pdf (last
visited Jan. 2, 2011).
46. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). In the case, the New York State Restaurant Association argued that § 81.50
was expressly preempted by NLEA and violated the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech. The court held that the city retained the authority to require restaurants to
include nutrition information of menus, but the court still granted summary judgment against the
New York City Board of Health because NLEA expressly preempted 81.50 because § 81.50
applied only to restaurants that voluntarilypublished calorie information. Id. at 352-53.
47. N.Y State Restaurant Ass'n v. N.Y City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
As part of its decision, the court explained that the NLEA allows for state regulation of nutrition
information for restaurants consistent with § 343(q), and held that New York City was within its
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more than 15 locations to post calorie information on menus and menu
boards in a prominent font.4 8
Soon after § 81.50's enactment in New York City, other localities
began passing similar laws.49 For example, in California in 2009,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law the first statewide
menu labeling law in the United States.50 As of 2010, five more states
have followed suit.5 1 In addition, as of 2010, sixteen states, Washington
D.C., and numerous local governments had introduced legislation to
52
require restaurants to post nutrition information on menus. Many
jurisdictions have gone beyond only requiring calorie disclosure, and
mandate other nutrition information postings on menus and menu
boards, such as disclosure of saturated fat, transfat, carbohydrate
content, and sodium content.
Early evidence regarding the effectiveness of calorie disclosures on
menus to influence healthier choices has been mixed, but some research
regarding local menu labeling laws shows that on average, patrons
bought foods with fewer calories where menu labels were present. 54
Public health advocates often argue that menu labels empower people to
take control of their intake and make healthier decisions, and thus
reduce obesity.5 This policy is analogous to the FDA's enactment of
authority to create a mandatory labeling requirement for restaurants to display factual
information consistent with the NLEA, but not assertions. Id. at 120.
48. N.Y. HEALTH CODE LAW § 81.50 (2008).
49. Nutrition Labeling in Chain Restaurants: State and Local Bills/Regulations-200920 10, http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/mlbillsummaries_09.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
50. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West 2009) (requires chain restaurants
with 20 or more locations to post calorie information for standard items on menu boards and
menus).
51. LEVI ET AL., supra note 7, at 7. The five states are: California, Massachusetts, Maine,
New Jersey, and Oregon. Id. at 46.
52. Id.
53. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159, 163 (2009). See e.g. City of
Philadelphia Bill No. 080167-A (amending Philadelphia Health Code tit. 6, § 102; § 308); King
County Health Code tit. 5 ch. 5.10.015.
54. A study in Los Angeles, which has many fast food chains, estimated that community
weight gain would decrease by 38% annually if California's new state menu labeling law, which
is similar to § 4205, induced only 10% of fast food customers to eat 100 calories less at each fast
food meal. See generally Tony Kuo et al., Menu Labelingas a PotentialStrategyfor Combating
the Obesity Epidemic: A Health Impact Assessment, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1680 (2009).
55. See Juliann Schaeffer, Big Changes Ahead-CalorieCounts and Prevention Are Key
Ingredients in Health Reform, TODAY'S DIETITIAN (June 2010), http://www.todaysdietitian.com/
newarchives/0602 10p20shtml. Clyde W. Yancy, president of the American Heart Association
sees menu labeling laws as:
a big step forward for Americans' health: "I can't believe that providing
information is intrusive in any way. Simply having the information, ironically,
emancipates us. If you put this in a context of freedom of choice, you don't
have that freedom now because if you select a menu item, you may perceive it
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similar labeling requirements under the NLEA for packaged food. 6
At Starbucks, when calories were posted on menu boards in New
York City, the average calorie content per transaction declined by an
average of 6% but did not result in a decrease in overall sales." A study
released in July 2011 surveyed lunch receipts for approximately 8000
people before and after the implementation of New York's law. The
study found that for the three main restaurant chains studied, customers
on average purchased between 44 and 80 fewer calories after the law
took effect.
Conversely, a recent study that analyzed nutrition data from 14 Taco
Time restaurants in California found that calorie disclosure on menus
had no significant impact on the amount of calories patrons purchased.
However, the study only looked at one chain, which already had a
"Healthy Highlights" icon on menus. 59 Further, such studies have not
measured what impact calorie disclosures on menus may have on other
food choices over the course of a day; for example, a customer who
consumes a hamburger and realizes it contains 1000 calories may
compensate by eating fewer calories during the rest of the day.
Accordingly, more research is needed to study the long-term effects of
menu labeling laws, impacts of repeated exposure, and impacts on
different ethnic and age groups of consumers.
Some commentators predict that menu labels do not create net losses
for the restaurant industry, and instead cause a shift of revenue from
chains offering mostly high calorie items to restaurants with lower
calorie choices.6 0 If so, every restaurant would likely be incentivized to
offer lower calorie meals, thus benefiting even non-observant
consumers, as menu items will gradually become lower in calorie
content when restaurants realize consumers are choosing to purchase
lower calorie offerings. Further research on this question is needed.
as healthy because of one or two buzzwords like spinach and not realize the
calorie count. But if the spinach is coated in Parmesan-crusted cheese, that just
changed the whole nutrition content of that dish. So my sense is that this
actually is empowering and gives us the freedom ... of choice."
Id.
56. Schulman, supra note 12, at 588.
57. Bryan Bolinger et al., CaloriePosting in Chain Restaurants (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15648, 2010), available at www.stanford.edu/-pleslie/calories.
pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
58. Katherine Hobson, Study Finds Menu Labeling Didn't Change Eating Habits, WALL
ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 14 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/healthl2011/01/14/study-finds-menulabeling-didnt-change-eating-habits.
5 9. Id.
60. Mark Berman & Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, Obesity Prevention in the Information Age:
Calorie Information at the Point of Purchase, 300 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 433, 434 (2008). See
generally Michelle I. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling Law and
Lessonsfrom Local Experience, 65 FooD DRUG L.J. 901, 914-15 (2010).
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Another study that analyzed menu labels and menu boards with a
contextual phrase reading "the recommended daily caloric intake for an
average adult is 2000 calories" found that when people were presented
with labels and contextual information, they consumed an average of
250 fewer calories during the day.61 Conversely, another study that
focused on low-income minorities in New York City did not find any
change in calorie consumption when calorie content was posted on
menu boards, although patrons did report that it influenced their
choices. 6 2 However, this second study only included customers who
voluntarily visit fast food restaurants, excluding consumers who already
avoid fast food.63 Another study found that where menu labeling is
required by law, restaurants were 58% more likely to offer food with
lower calorie options. 64 In addition, a survey in New York City found
89% of respondents were in favor of the New York menu labeling
law.65 Again, further research is needed regarding the connection
between more comprehensive menu labeling and consumer decisions to
make healthier purchases.
Opponents of menu labeling generally argue that the policy is a
paternalistic and unnecessary government imposition on personal
autonomy and the free market, with costs that will burden restaurants. 66
Countering this argument, Judge Richard Posner points out that "a law
aimed at reducing obesity would be paternalistic if obesity did not
produce external costs, but it does, because obese people consume a
disproportionate amount of medical resources, and there is extensive
public and private subsidization of medical expenses." 67 In addition,
critics argue that the cost of implementation of menu labeling for
restaurants will be extreme. One report notes that the cost of
implementing the New York City regulation has been estimated from
$2,000-$5,000 for each restaurant, 68 but the Federal Obesity Working
61.

Christina A Roberto et al., Evaluatingthe Impact of Menu Labeling on Food Choices

andIntake, AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH (forthcoming 2011).

62.

Brian Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A FirstLook at the Effects on

Low-Income People in New York City, HEALTH AFF., 1110-21 (2009).

63. Schulman, supra note 12, at 600 (2010).
64. Bolinger et al., supra note 57.
65. Technomic, Inc. Executive Summary: Consumer Reaction to Calorie Disclosure on
Menus/menu Boards in New York City, Feb. 2009.
66. Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to be Postedat Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/24menu.html?scp=1&sq=menu%20
labeling&st=cse.
67. Richard A. Posner, Compelled Disclosure of Food Characteristics,Becker-Posner
Blog (July 27, 2008), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/07/compelled-disclosure-offood-characteristics--posner.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
68. Tiffini Diage, Menu CaloriePostings in Restaurants: Policy Intervention to Prevent
and Reduce Obesity, 9 U. Wis. POPULATION HEALTH INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF No. 4, at 2 (Nov.

2009), http://uwphi.pop health.wisc.edu/publications/issueBriefs/issueBriefv09nO4.pdf.
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Group Report explains that obtaining nutrition information "is easier
today because nutrient composition databases and software for labeling
are readily available," leaving the updating of menu boards as the only
substantial cost. 69 Opponents also argue that menu labels will reduce
restaurant revenue, but as discussed above, the data on this point is
currently inconclusive.
II. OVERVIEW OF § 4205
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Affordable Care
Act into law. Section 4205 of the ACA mandates uniform regulations
for large chains, but generally does not directly interfere with individual
and small scale businesses. Section A of this Part provides an overview
of § 4205, and section B explains the legal requirements of the statute.
Finally, section C outlines enforcement and implementation
uncertainties.
A. Introductionto § 4205
Modeled after existing local and state laws, § 4205 amends the
FDCA to require chain establishments of covered entities with 20 or
more national locations with the same name and essentially the same
menu items to post calorie information, along with the number of
calories recommended for daily consumption, in a prominent location.
Section 4205 explicitly preempts state or local laws that are different
from § 4205 regarding nutrient disclosure on menus, thus disabling
localities from implementing regulations that require greater
disclosure.70 In addition, with respect to vending machines, no state or
locality may implement requirements that are not identical to the federal
requirements, regardless of how many vending machines a particular
corporation owns or operates.7 1 The House Committee on Energy and
Commerce reports that the purpose of § 4205 is to "give consumers
important health information, and allow them to exercise choice and
responsibility about what they and their children eat."72 However, by
creating a unitary federal ceiling in the name of uniformity, the law
69. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Calories Count: Report of the Working Group
on Obesity (July 1, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/ucm08
1770.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
70. LEVI ET AL., supra note 7, at 46 ("An identical state or local law may make it possible
for state or local personnel-who generally do not enforce federal law-to effectively monitor
compliance with menu labeling standards."). Id.
71. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)).
72. H.R. REP. No. 111-299, at 2562 (2009).
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effectively stifles the potential for localities to experiment with different
regulations.7 3
Initially, the restaurant industry resisted federal menu labeling
regulation, claiming that it is a "paternalistic intervention" and that it
"enfeebles the notion of personal responsibility." 74 As more localities
began to implement menu labeling regulations and the Second Circuit
upheld New York City's § 81.50 Ordinance, the industry, perhaps
recognizing the inevitability of the laws, and wanting to have
standardized regulations throughout the country, shifted its standpoint.
The National Restaurant Association supported the federal nutrition
disclosure standard in the ACA, stating that the existing "patchwork of
regulation is confusing to the consumer . . . [and] difficult and

expensive for operators." 75 Still, not all politicians were convinced.
Representative Donald Manzullo (R-L) argued that federal menu
labeling contributes to the "micromanag[ing] [ofj all aspects of
Americans' health."
Already, § 4205 is spurring a great deal of discussion, as restaurant
and vending machine owners attempt to understand their new
obligations, and some scholars have also begun to comment on §
4205." On its face, § 4205 may appear to be a public health victory, but
this new law presents problematic uncertainties. Most significantly, the
law serves as a unitary federal ceiling that preempts stricter regulations
and new disclosure approaches at the state and local level.
B. Legal Requirements of§ 4205
Section 4205 outlines some specific rules regarding nutrient
78
disclosure, and leaves the promulgation of regulations to the FDA. In
restaurants and other covered establishments under § 4205, calorie
content must be posted on menus, menu boards, drive through displays,
73. For instance, Philadelphia's law requires more nutrition information than calories to
be posted on the menu or menu board. City of Philadelphia Bill No. 080167-A (amending
Philadelphia Health Code tit. 6, § 102; § 308).
74. Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity: The New FrontierofPublic Health Law, 354 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 2601, 2602 (2006), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMhpr
060227.
75. National Restaurant Association, Public Policy Issue Briefs, 2010, http://www.
restaurant.org/advocacy/issues/issue/?Issue=menulabel; Janet Adamy, Coming Soon: Theaters,
Airplanes to Post Calories, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052748704323704575462021475610064.html.
76. 155 CONG. REC. H12902 (2009).
77. See, e.g., Banker, supra note 60, at 901 (comparing federal menu labeling to state and
local requirements).
78. The FDA is an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, and is
responsible for implementing § 4205.
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internet and take-out menus if they are the primary menu used for
ordering, or other avenues in close proximity to the item.7 9 Buffets,
salad bars, and other displays are included.so Seasonal items that are on
menus for less than 60 days, market testing of food items for less than
90 days, condiments, and custom orders are exempt.8 ' The FDA has not
yet issued final regulations for "variable items," such as deli sandwiches
that are assembled using an assortment of toppings, but has proposed
options under consideration in its proposed rules. 82
Covered establishments must also be able to provide additional
information in writing, including fat, sodium, and sugar content, if
requested, and menus must include a statement stating that such written
nutrition information is available to customers upon request. 83 The
Secretary of Heath and Human Services (HHS) may require disclosure
of additional nutrient information in a written form if the Secretary
determines that such disclosures are necessary to keep the public
informed.8 4 Additionally, establishments must also "post prominently" a
statement of the FDA's recommended average calorie intake, which has
not yet been released in final form.85 Finally, vending machine
operators must also post calorie information, visible in a clear and
conspicuous manner for consumers to view, before the point of
purchase for food items. 86 The law does not affect state or local labeling
requirements that concern the safety of food, such as warning
statements, consumer advisories, or allergen labeling. 87
Restaurant chains and covered establishments with less than 20
establishments nationwide are exempt from § 4205, and are required to
79. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5) (H)). The FDA released proposed rules on April 1, 2011, and proposed that retail food
establishments be defined as "an establishment whose primary business activity is the sale of
food to consumers," or in the alternative as an "establishment where the sale of restaurant or
restaurant-type food--as opposed to food in general--is the primary business activity of that
establishment." Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments (Proposed Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter ProposedRules].
80. Id.
81. Id. One could foresee restaurants evading disclosure requirements by keeping its
entire menu, or just the unhealthiest offerings, as seasonal items or market test items.
82. ProposedRules, supra note 79.
83. Id.
84. Id. ("If the Secretary determines that a nutrient, other than a nutrient required under
subclause (ii)(Ill), should be disclosed for the purpose of providing information to assist
consumers in maintaining healthy dietary practices, the Secretary may require, by regulation,
disclosure of such nutrient in the written form required under subclause (ii)(III).").
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. U.S. Food & Drug Adm'n, Draft Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers
Regarding Implementation of the Menu Labeling Provisions of Section 4205 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Aug. 24, 2010, http://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/ucm
223266.htm [hereinafterDraft Guidance].
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comply with any applicable state or local menu labeling laws. However,
such establishments may voluntarily opt into compliance with 4205,
which is an effective exemption from state or local regulation." While
such a policy was likely enacted to insulate small businesses from the
cost of calculating nutrient content, this gap in disclosure is a significant
missing link from making calorie content available for all consumers
and achieving public health goals of information dissemination and
obesity reduction.
Section 4205 includes a reasonable basis standard for restaurants to
use when determining and presenting nutrition information. 9 This
standard recognizes there will be inevitable variability in preparation of
foods, and gives restaurants some degree of flexibility when
determining nutrition data. Restaurants may calculate nutrition data
using "nutrient databases, cookbooks, laboratory analyses, and other
reasonable means." 90 The degree of flexibility permitted, and how the
FDA will enforce the standard, is still unclear. 9 ' In addition, § 4205
directs the FDA to "specify the format and manner" of the nutrient
postings and promulgate regulations for implementation.92 Depending
on how the FDA decides to enforce the statute, violations of § 4205 will
likely render a food item misbranded under the FDCA, which could
result in civil and criminal penalties. 9 3
In August 2010, the FDA released a Draft Guidance document,
which was subsequently withdrawn in January 2011 to incorporate
many comments received by the FDA. 94 The withdrawn guidance
indicated that § 4205 does apply to alcoholic beverages, which would
present a disclosure inconsistency because alcoholic beverages sold at
88. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)). For example, New York City's ordinance will continue to apply to chains with
15 to 19 locations nationally unless the restaurant chains voluntarily comply with the federal
regulations. See N.Y. HEALTH CODE LAW § 81.50 (2008), available at http://24.97.
137.100/nyc/RCNY/Title24_81_50.asp?zoom-highlight-81.50.
89. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)) (for pertinent information, refer to 124 Stat. 574.).
90. Id.
91. The FDA will determine if restaurants must provide exact numbers, or can instead
display rounded estimates. One study found that the actual calorie content varied by an average
of 18% between numbers posted on menus and what was actually contained in the dishes.
Banker, supra note 60, at 924.
92. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)) (for pertinent information, refer to 124 Stat. 574.).
93. ProposedRules, supra note 79.
94. See U.S. Food & Drug Adm'n, Withdrawal of Draft FDA Guidance for Industry:
Questions and Answers RegardingImplementation of the Menu Labeling Provisionsof Section
4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, http://www.fda.gov/
Food/NewsEvents/ConstituentUpdates/ucm240574.htm ("FDA now intends to complete the
notice and Article rulemaking process for section 4205 before initiating enforcement
activities.") [hereinafter Withdrawal ofDraft Guidance].
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grocery stores and other non-covered restaurants do not have to disclose
such information on packages and bottles.9 5 The proposed rule released
by the FDA for comment in April 2011 "tentatively concludes that the
new menu labeling requirements do not apply to alcohol beverages."96
Thus, the final impact on alcoholic beverages remains unclear.
Finally, exactly which establishments beyond conventional
restaurants fall under the regulations is yet to be determined, and will
likely be finalized in 2012. The withdrawn draft guidance took a broad
interpretation of covered entities, including establishments such as
coffee shops, movie theaters, and airlines, which are not traditional
restaurants.97 The proposed rules offered options for determining which
entities were covered more narrowly, suggesting that only
establishments whose primary business activity is serving food may be
covered. Again, the FDA's final interpretation of covered entities is
not yet clear.
The FDA should also release guidance or regulations explaining how
franchises are regulated under § 4205. The language of § 4205 specifies
that covered establishments are chains "with 20 or more locations doing
business under the same name (regardless of the type of ownership of
the locations) and offering for sale substantially the same menu
items." 99 The FDA has stated that the determination of "whether a chain
has 20 or more locations does not depend on the type of ownership of
locations," and the FDA should clarify exactly how the statute applies
to franchises. 00 For example, it remains uncertain whether the
franchisee is required to undertake an independent nutrition analysis, or
if a franchisee could rely on nutrient data provided b' the franchisor,
and who would be held accountable for any violations. 1
95. Draft Guidance, supra note 87 ("alcoholic beverages are considered food as defined
in the FDCA. . . . the nutrition disclosure requirements in section 4205 apply in cases where
these foods are listed on a menu or menu board or are otherwise covered under section 4205,
even though they may be regulated by other agencies in other circumstances"). However, there
is some discussion about requiring alcohol manufactures to provide nutrition labels on bottles.
Washington Post, Alcohol Industry Battles Among Itself Over the Issue ofNutrition Labels, Dec.
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123004789.
html (accessed Jan. 3, 2011).
96. "FDA recognizes that at least one court has held that TTB has exclusive jurisdiction
over the labels of the alcohol beverages it regulates under the FAA Act. Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Ky. 1976)." ProposedRules, supra note 79.
97. Draft Guidance, supra note 87.
98. ProposedRules, supra note 79.
99. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)). Although counter to business motives, one could envision a new phenomenon of
restaurant chains with 19 locations nationally.
100. ProposedRules, supra note 79.
101. Anthony J. Marks, Menu Label Laws: A Survey, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 90, 96 (2009)
("Will a franchisee have a reasonable basis if it relies on the franchisor's information?");
Banker, supranote 60, at 925.
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Implementation and Enforcement of§ 4205

Section 4205 is currently in effect, although the FDA has decided to
delay enforcement, explaining that the agency:
is aware that industry may need additional guidance from FDA
and time to comply with the provisions of section 4205 that
became requirements immediately upon enactment of the law.
Accordingly, FDA expects to refrain from initiating enforcement
action until after a time period established in the final
guidance. 02
In August 2010, the FDA released its first guidance document,
which explains that states and local governments cannot "directly or
indirectly impose any nutrition labeling requirements that are different
from, or not imposed by (or contained in) section 4205, or the related
implementing regulations."' 0 3 However, § 4205 does allow states and
localities that meet certain criteria to apply for an exemption from
§ 4205, but as of January 2011, none have been filed. The draft
guidance released by the FDA in August 2010 addressed the issues of
which establishments are covered under the statute, food items requirin
labels, disclosure of nutrition information, and compliance timing,
but the FDA later withdrew the guidance in January 2011, explaining
that the
FDA received many comments on the draft guidance and on a
public docket which FDA opened to solicit comment. Based, in
part, on these comments, FDA now intends to complete the
notice and comment rulemaking process for section 4205 before
initiating enforcement activities and will not be publishing a final
guidance on menu labeling at this time. o0
On April 16, 2011, the FDA released proposed rules and options
under consideration, titled "Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of
102. Draft Guidance, supra note 87. However, this draft guidance was later withdrawn.
Withdrawal ofDraft Guidance,supra note 94.
103. U.S. Food & Drug Adm'n, Guidancefor Industry: Questions andAnswers Regarding
Implementation of the Menu Labeling Provisions of Section 4205 of the Patient Protectionand
Affordable Care Act of 2010 on State and Local Menu and Vending Machine Labeling Laws,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Fo
odLabelingNutrition/ucm223408.htm [hereinafter Guidance for Industry]. However, "FDA's
guidance documents . . . do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. Instead, guidance
. . . should be viewed only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory
requirements are cited." Id.
104. Draft Guidance,supra note 87.
105. Withdrawal ofDraft Guidance,supra note 94.
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Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food
Establishments" and "Food labeling: Calorie labeling of articles of food
in vending machines," for public comment although final rules have not

been released.106
An issue that has caused some confusion is the extent to which
§ 4205 is self-executing, as opposed to dependent on the issuance of
specific regulations from the FDA. The statute itself explains that "not
later than 1 year 0 7 after the date of enactment of this clause, the
Secretary of HHS shall promulgate proposed regulations to carry out
this clause," but there is uncertainty as to the scope and depth of the
guidance the FDA, the implementing agency, will issue."o The FDA is
in the process of accepting comments on the proposed rules, and as of
October 2011, the FDA has indicated that they plan to have final
regulations in place by June 2012109 and make the regulations effective
six months later. 0 Further, some confusion has existed regarding when
the preemption provisions will go into effect, and thereby changing
regulations that are in effect in states and localities. In the first guidance
document, the FDA explained that the preemption of state and local
laws that are not operationally identical to § 4205 was immediate upon
the enactment of the ACA on March 23, 2010.111 Even so, the FDA has

stated that it will 2give restaurants time to comply before it begins to
enforce the law." Although that timing is not clear, it will likely be
articulated in subsequent releases of guidance. In the proposed rules
released in April 2011, the FDA tentatively projected that "the final rule
become effective six months from the date of its publication," but noted
that such a deadline was not certain.113 Many restaurants are not
expected to begin compliance until enforcement begins.114 In addition,
to the extent that litigation arises over the statute and regulations, actual
implementation may be further delayed." 5
106. ProposedRules, supra note 79.
107. March 23, 2011 will be one year after the enactment of the ACA. However, as of
March 30, 2011, the FDA had not released guidance documents.
108. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205(b) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)(i)) (for pertinent information, refer to Patient Protection, 124 Stat. 575.).
109. Food and Drug Administration, Implement Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/FDATrack/track-proj?program=healthca
re-reform&id=ACA-4205-Implementation (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
110. 76 Fed. Reg. 19192, 19219 (2011).
111. Guidancefor Industry,supra note 103.
112. See supra text accompanying note 102.
113. ProposedRules, supra note 79.
114. Janet Adamy, Coming Soon: Theaters,Airplanes to Post Calories,WALL ST. J. (Aug.
31, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704323704575462021475610064.ht
ml.
115. For example, is possible to imagine chains with fewer than 20 establishments arguing
that § 4205 "impliedly preempts local menu-labeling laws to the extent that imposing stricter
regulations on smaller chains defies the intent of Sec. 4205." Although those smaller chains
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III. ANALYSIS OF § 4205 IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM: STATE
EXPERIMENTALISM VERSUS UNIFORM FEDERAL STANDARDS AND
RESULTING CHALLENGES

The U.S. Constitution does not expressly give Congress the power to
promulgate specific public health regulations. Historically, public health
has been an area of law and regulation reserved for the states.116 A
recent congressional report explained, "[flederal law has traditionally
been a 'floor' in the health, safety, and environmental area, mandating
minimal federal protections but allowing states to adopt more stringent
requirements."" Over time, the role of the federal government in
legislating in the name of public health has increased. Congress's power
to act in the name of public health derives from the Commerce Clause,
the Taxing and Spending Clause, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause." 8 Presently, both the states and the federal government carry
out public health practice as part of a system of cooperative federalism,
where regulatory power is not neatly assigned into independent state
and federal layers. 1 One of the most enduring features of federalism in
the United States is the tension between the federal government and
state government for control over policy.120
Regulation at each level of government has specific benefits and
downfalls. The level of government best suited for addressing specific
public health issues depends on the evidence identifying the nature of
the problem, the resources available to each level to address the
problem, and the probability of success.121 For example, the federal
government "has more resources and expertise in many areas and can
address issues that cross state lines, while states have the ability to craft
could simply opt into § 4205 voluntarily, the possibility of litigation to attempt to be exempted
from any regulation still lingers. Banker, supra note 60, at 926. Furthermore, litigation could
potentially proceed under the constitutional argument that § 4205 compels commercial speech
improperly. In more recent years, the Supreme Court has been expanding the protection of
commercial speech, so an argument of this nature is a potential, but weak, legal hurdle. Michelle
M. Melo et al., Obesity- The New FrontierofPublic Health Law, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED., 260110 (2006). See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (striking-down
Massachusetts regulations restricting advertising of tobacco products within 1000 feet of
schools).
116. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
117. Congressional Preemption of State Laws and Regulations, US House of
Representative, Committee on Government Reform- Minority Staff, Special Investigations
Division (June 2006).
118. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 52-53.
119. Michele E. Gilman, Presidential Power in the Obama Administration: Early
Reflections: Presidents,Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. ARTICLEARY 339, 343 (2010).
120. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 73.
121. LAWRENCE 0. GosTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 79, 3d

(2008).
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creative solutions to complex local problems and implement the
solutions at local levels."1 2 This Part first explores the benefits and
consequences of different regulatory systems in section A, and then
discusses the implications and resulting inconsistencies of the § 4205
regulatory ceiling under the following headings in section B: (1)
Preemption of State and Local Laws; (2) Disparate Impact on Small
Businesses; (3) Possible Preemption of State Common Law Tort Suits;
(4) Potential Creation of a Regulatory Freeze; and (5) Additional
Inconsistencies and Implementation Challenges.
A. Federalism:FederalFloors and Ceilings
The degree to which local, state, and federal forces are involved in
each regulatory scheme varies, although it is rare for any level to
surrender power completely.123 Under the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI of the Constitution, when a direct conflict exists between a federal
and state statute, the federal law trumps the state law.124 However, the
Supreme Court has explained there is a presumption against
preemption: "we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [federal law] unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 25
In some cases, the political environment will impact the scope and
reach of discretionary federal preemption in certain areas. During the
Bush Administration, from 2001-2006, Congress enacted 27 statutes
that preempt state health, safety and other regulations.12 6 Conversely, in
May 2009, President Obama released a memorandum emphasizing the
important role of the states in protecting the health and welfare of the
United States. 127 President Obama cautioned "preemption of State law
by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with
full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a
sufficient legal basis for preemption."' 28
Federalism and preemption can take varying forms, with different
levels of government retaining different amounts and types of power. In
some cases of cooperative federalism, the federal and state governments
122. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 55. Often, public health regulations devised at the
federal level are actively implemented at the state or local level through grant and incentive
programs.
123. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1550 (2007).
124. GOODMANETAL.,supra note 14, at 51-52.
125. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 at 1194-95 (2009) (quoting Medtroinic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
126. GosTIN, supranote 121, at 82.
127. Memorandum from President Barack Obama, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption.
128. Id.
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share multilayered authority. 29 Most often, the federal government will
enact a legislative floor, or minimum requirement, and preserve the
ability of states and localities to add additional requirements.130 Within
this structure, states and localities are not permitted to go below the
floor, but can adopt more restrictive rules, thus preserving some
autonomy.13 1 This is a common approach for environmental laws.132
When given the opportunity to improvise and make policy for the
public's health, states "have led the way on countless matters, from
requiring health insurers to cover mammograms to stringently
regulating mercury emissions from power plants."' 33 States are able to
reach distinctive and optimal decisions that reflect the preferences of the
geographic population.134 Further, legal scholar Nina Mendelson notes
that for other states and the federal government "an opportunity to learn
from a particular state's unique attempts to solve its local problems is a
value that accrues nationally."' 35 Under such regulatory schemes, the
benefits of multiple regulatory voices, creative implementation
approaches, and common law litigation are retained to some extent.
Conversely, when the federal government engulfs an entire sphere of
regulation, it enacts a regulatory unitary federal ceiling, above which
states may not regulate. Unitary federal ceilings prohibit states from
adding to federal requirements in a particular area of law. In addition,
ceilings do not permit state and local laws that are less stringent than the
federal standard as well.' 3 7 Until recently, unitary federal ceilings were
a rarity.138
Different rationales exist for separate levels of government having
responsibility for various issues. Preemption can be seen a positive
policy or a negative policy depending on one's perspective and
position.13 9 "Preemption power is beneficial . . . when the context
129.

See also ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM TOWARD THE PROTECTION

OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 96 (2009) (for a discussion of polyphonic federalism, which promotes

"the dynamic interaction" of multiple sources of overlapping power).
130. Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1554.
13 1. Ted Mermin, Preemption: What it is, How it Works, and Why it Matters for Public
Health, NATIONAL POLICY & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY,

http://www.nplanonline.org/nplan/products/preemption-and-public-health (2009).
132. Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism,
in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 98,

101 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
133. Mendelson, supra note 25.
134.

.SCHAPIRO, supra note 129, at 74-75.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Mendelson, supra note 25, at 767.
Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1555-66.
Mermin, supra note 131.
Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1552.

139.

JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION,

REGULATION AND LITIGATION 21 (2006) ("Different perspectives on federal preemption relate to

the incentives of the viewer: '[W]here you stand on it depends on where you sit."').
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justifies the political choice to impose a single nationwide answer to a
complex social concern."40 In some cases, it is more efficient to
address matters locally, and other times, a national scale provides
greater efficiency.'41
The principles in support of enacting unitary federal ceilings that
preempt additional regulation are uniformity, certainty, consistency,
stability, and convenience for business owners.142 Invalidating state
laws through ceiling preemption prevents a patchwork of differing laws
and saves companies from accommodating each state's specific
regulations.14 3 For instance, corporations may favor federal preemption
when it reduces potential liability and spells out uniform compliance
standards, which in turn avoids balkanization and reduces production
and transaction costs. 1" Businesses often argue that the costs of
complying with multiple jurisdictions' heightened requirements are too
expensive, and that uniformity and predictability are vital to "reducing
costs and greventing inadvertent violations," and achieving economies
of scale.14 Further, some argue that the federal government has vast
resources and scientific expertise with which they can better address
complicated health problems.146
In contrast, many preemptive laws have diminished the level of
protection previously afforded by local regulations. Individuals may be
frustrated with preemptive regulations when such policies impose limits
on damages awarded for negligent industry practices.147 Some argue
that the "patchwork" defense of ceiling prevention tends to be more
"hypothetical than real," because businesses have managed to adapt to
different regulations both in the United States and abroad, and other
countries often have more stringent regulations regardless.148 Often,
"the unfortunate result [of ceiling preemption] is that big businesses'
revenues are being shielded, while protections for consumers and the
environment are being stripped away."l 49 Further, complete preemption
reduces the amount of debate over and education about local policies,' 5 0
and often fails to fit local needs because the "unit of governance closest
140. Id. at210.
141.
CENTURY
142.
143.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT:
119 (2008).
GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 73.
Mermin, supra note 131.

FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST

144. Gilman, supra note 119, at 383; Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A
Collective Action Perspectiveon Ceiling Preemptionby FederalEnvironmentalRegulation: The
Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 579, 591 (2008).
145. Mermin, supra note 131.
146. GoSTIN, supra note 121, at 109.
147. Gilman, supra note 119, at 383.
148. Mermin, supra note 131.
149. Mendelson, supra note 25.
150. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 74.
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to the people is likely to be most responsive to people's needs."' 5 1
Preemption ceilings can result in a regulatory freeze, where the law
does not change because there is little energy and incentive to improve
existing laws and make them better. As Justice Brandeis explained, "[i]t
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."l 52 When states are not afforded the ability to experiment,
interact, and try new approaches due to federal ceilings, there is often
little opportunity and incentive to adjust existing federal laws. 5 3 In such
cases, preservation of common law tort and nuisance liability can also
be used to retain incentives to continuously improve operations and
makes changes to reduce risk. 154
In addition to quashing incentives to improve existing laws, federal
regulatory ceilings are often administered through agencies, which can
present another layer of separation from states' interests. Nina
Mendelson complains that federal agencies often lack the capacity to
weigh the values of "abstract federalism," such as the impact of
regulations "upon a state's dignity or a state's function as a policy
'laboratory' or center of democratic activity." 5
B.

Problematic Uncertaintiesof§ 4205 in the
Context of Federalism

As explained in Part II, § 4205 explicitly preempts state and local
laws regarding nutrient disclosure on menus that do not use the
language of § 4205 itself.'5 6 This section first explores the preemption
151.

O'REILLY,supra note 139, at 209.

152. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
153. What may seem like a good trade now may consequently prevent even better
regulations in the future. For example:
In the 1980s having separate sections for smokers and nonsmokers in
restaurants seemed like a bold proposal. But, if to secure a statewide "smoking
section" law, advocates had agreed to then preempt all local laws having to do
with smoking in restaurants, there would have been no opportunity a decade
later to enact local laws banning smoking from restaurants entirely.
Mermin, supra note 131.
154. Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1588. Buzbee notes "As the Supreme Court majority
concluded in the Bates, such common law incentives can reinforce and supplement the
protections provided in regulatory regimes." Id. at 1588-89.
155. Mendelson, supra note 135, at 781-82.
156. For a comparison of some existing local laws to the federal law, see generally Center
for Science in the Public Interest, Comparison of Menu Labeling Policies,
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/comparison of ml policies_6-9.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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provisions of § 4205, and examines the possibility of exemptions to the
preemption requirements. This section then explores how different
stakeholders will likely receive § 4205, the potential preemptive effect
of § 4205 on state common law tort suits, and the potential for § 4205 to
create a regulatory freeze, and will identify additional problematic
uncertainties of § 4205.
1. Section 4205 Expressly Preempts State or Local Laws Regarding
Nutrient Disclosure that are Different From § 4205, But Exemptions
from Preemption May Be Available
Public health advocates see § 4205 as a mixed blessing. In one sense,
§ 4205 expands menu disclosures to states and localities that would
probably not have enacted regulations on their own. On the contrary, §
4205 usurps local power, preventing states and localities from
implementing regulations that require greater disclosure, and limiting
their ability to develop their own innovative approaches to the problem
of food labeling.
Some states and localities enacted anticipatory regulations predating
§ 4205 to actively prevent menu disclosures. For example, in Georgia,
the General Assembly passed a ceiling preemption provision that
prohibits local menu labeling laws, even though Georgia has no state
menu labeling law.' 57 Conversely, some localities already had menu
labeling regulations prior to the passage of the ACA that exceeded the
level of disclosure in § 4205. Those laws are essentially void for chains
with over 20 locations, unless the localities apply for, and are granted,
an exemption from the FDA.
Additional disclosures on menu boards may be an important and
timely public health tool. For example, in 2007, Metropolitan King
County City Council of Washington amended the Board of Health
regulations to require chain restaurants (any restaurant with more than
10 establishments under the same name in the United States) to provide
the total number of calories, fat, saturated fat, carbohydrates, and
sodium on menu boards, beginning in 2008.158 Further, in January 2011,
a report on the U.S. Dietary Guidelines was released that recommended
that people reduce sodium intake to 2300 mg per day, and those with
certain complicating factors (which includes approximately half of the
population) further reduce intake to 1500 mg per day.159 Sodium is a
157. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-373(a) (2009). "[N]o county board of health or political
subdivision of this state shall enact any ordinance or issue any rules and regulations pertaining
to the provision of food nutrition information at food service establishments." Id.
158. King County Health Code tit. 5, ch. 5.10.015. See also City of Philadelphia Bill No.
080167-A, 2008 Leg. Sess. (amending Philadelphia Health Code tit. 6, § 102; § 308).
159. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE & U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS (7th ed. 2010).
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significant public health challenge, and foods that are low in calories are
not necessarily low in sodium.' 6 0 Certainly, a clear and prevalent
announcement of sodium content in restaurant foods on menus may
help people make informed decisions resulting in reduced sodium
intake, and the same rationale may be extended to other ingredients and
consequential health complications.
In a guidance document that was released in August 2010, the FDA
explained that states and localities that had their own nutrition labeling
requirements prior to the enactment of the ACA ma apply for an
exemption from the preemption provision in the law.' 6 The Secretary
of HHS may grant such exemptions if the state requirement will not
cause any food to be in violation of any applicable requirement under
Federal law, will not unduly burden interstate commerce, and is
designed to address a particular need for information that is not met by
the preemptive Federal requirement (21 U.S.C.S. § 343-1(a)).162 It is
unclear how liberal the FDA will be in granting exemption petitions,
and as of January 2011, no exemption petitions have been filed. While
the guidance seems to imply that only state and local laws that were
enacted before the ACA qualify, it would not be unreasonable for the
FDA to also consider exempting state and local regulations that were
proposed, but not enacted, prior to the enactment of the ACA.16 3
2. Section 4205 Exempts Restaurants with Fewer than Twenty
Establishments From the Federal Regulations, Thus Smaller Businesses
Will Not Bear Equal Responsibility for America's Weight Crisis
Section 4205 created a fundamental inconsistency between chains of
twenty or more locations and those of less than twenty locations. As
such, restaurants with fewer than twenty establishments will not
necessarily bear equal responsibility for America's weight crisis. With
the passage of the ACA, small chains and single establishment
restaurants still fall under local and state jurisdiction regarding menulabeling disclosures. Some state and local laws currently in effect apply
to restaurant chains with 15 or more outlets nationwide, a broader reach
than the new federal law.164
160. For example, Chili's Chicken Enchilada soup only has 400 calories but has 1630 mg
of sodium. Chili's, http://www.chilis.com/EN/Nutrition%201nformation/ChilisNutritionMen
u_Generic.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
161. See Guidancefor Industry, supra note 103 (explaining that the FDA's regulations
allow any State or locality to petition the FDA for an exemption from preemption, and
describing the procedure).
162. 21 U.S.C.S. § 343-1(b).
163. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
164. Banker, supra note 60, at 909; see, e.g., King County Health Code tit. 5, ch. 5.10.015
(2007); City of Philadelphia Bill No. 080167-A (amending Philadelphia Health Code tit. 6, §
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With the passage of the ACA, small businesses could be subject to
more stringent local laws if states or localities enact laws applying to
restaurants with fewer than 20 locations. However, even if such laws are
passed regulating restaurants with fewer than 20 locations, if
establishments would prefer to operate under § 4205, they can opt in.165
Of course, localities could pass local laws that are identical to § 4205, in
effect eviscerating the option of small businesses to opt in to the federal
statute. At the same time, it is likely that many localities may not pass
local laws, because localities may not have much of a political incentive
to devote resources to regulating restaurants with fewer than 20
locations and such restaurants can still opt into § 4205 compliance.
Thus, such restaurants would be exempt from any disclosure
regulations, and would therefore have a potential economic advantage
over larger establishments.166 Conversely, according to one estimate,
businesses with 20 or more outlets covered by § 4205 comprise only
25% of the restaurant industry, so localities may still try to regulate
smaller businesses.' 67
Accordingly, small chains and individual establishments will likely
wait to see if localities enact new regulations. If local laws are
nonetheless enacted, the restaurants and chains with less than 20
locations will likely compare those regulations to § 4205, and likely opt
in to § 4205 if those standards are more desirable.' 68 This policy was
likely enacted to protect small businesses from costs of nutrient
calculation and posting, but this inconsistent treatment of establishments
by size will create an informational vacuum for the consumer. Chains
without any menu disclosure may skew patrons' perceptions of what is
actually healthy. 169 Patrons will have a limited awareness of calorie
counts, and because they are exempt from regulation under the ACA,
there are no incentives for smaller chains to offer healthier dishes. The
ability to choose which regulations, if any, to operate under creates
inefficiency based on the size of restaurant businesses and creates a
disparate burden for large restaurant establishments as opposed to
smaller enterprises.
102; § 308).
165. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205(b) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)(i)).
166. While the Starbucks study found no loss in revenue when calories were posted, more
research must be done to fully understand the economic impact of calorie postings and lack
thereof. Bolinger et al., supra note 57.
167. Banker, supra note 60, at 928 (citing Julie Jargon, Menu Labeling Stirs Controversy,
WALL ST. J., July 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124786160526159703.html).
168. Id. at 925.
169. One could compare this discrepancy to foods sold in grocery stores. Typically, the
unlabeled foods (e.g., fruits and vegetables) are healthier than the packaged food with nutrient
disclosures.
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An additional potential challenge exists regarding establishments
that may not fall under the FDA's definition of covered entities; if the
FDA construes § 4205's language narrowly, such businesses would fall
outside preemption exemption existing in § 4205 that allows for state
and local regulation of chains with less than 20 establishments.170 For
example, if the FDA does not include hospitals as a covered
establishment, then a state or locality may be prohibited from regulating
the hospital because it is not a covered entity with less than 20
locations. Such an interpretation "would risk creating a regulatory gap
that would be inconsistent with the purposes of section 4205." The FDA
should clarify its interpretation and allow states and localities to require
nutrition labeling for food sold by entities not covered under § 4205 per
the FDA's final rules.17 1 America's obesity crisis is a public concern
with public implications, and policies should be designed so that
responsibility is borne equally by all business leaders.
3. Section 4205 is Silent Regarding Possible Preemption of State
Common Law Tort Suits, Presenting a Problematic Uncertainty and
Potentially Eroding Consumer Safety
In addition to express preemption issues, there are other
consequences of § 4205 preemption to consider. For instance, § 4205 is
silent on its potential preemptive effect on fast food lawsuits. This is
problematic because the provision could be interpreted as a barrier for
recovery in tort suits, which often serve as a safety valve for the general
public and can catalyze improvements in laws.
a. Fast Food Tort Lawsuits
Tort litigation can be an effective tool to promote the public's health,
although the litigation system does impose economic costs and other
burdens on stakeholders, such as restaurants and the general public
whose taxes fund the court system.172 To date, fast food lawsuits
predicated on restaurant foods as the cause of health problems have not
fared well in courts, but considering the evolution of tobacco litigation,
it is not implausible to imagine some tort success against fast food
restaurants in the future. The general unwillingness of courts to
entertain lawsuits involving claims for obesity related health issues
resulting from fast food consumption rests on the ideas of personal
responsibility and individual rights.173 The danger of restaurant food is
170.
171.
172.
173.

ProposedRules, supra note 79.
Id.
GOsTIN,supranote 121, at 182.
See generally Glenna Novack, Lawsuits in the Fast Food Nation, 52 WAYNE L. REv.
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less clear because food in general is not inherently dangerous and causal
conclusions may be more difficult to draw.174 Regardless of the strength
of their suits, some plaintiffs file simply to arouse negative publicity for
the food or beverage manufacturer or restaurant, or in order to compel
restaurants to change their menu offerings to include healthier
choices.
Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. is the first fast food tort lawsuit
claiming damages from obesity related health problems as the result of
fast food consumption.176 In Pelman, two minors brought a suit against
McDonald's, claiming that the fast food chain made them overweight,
and as a result, contributed to multiple health problems including heart
disease, diabetes and elevated cholesterol levels.177 The plaintiffs
brought multiple causes of action against McDonald's, including
deceptive advertising and business practices, negligence in selling
unhealthy and dangerous products, failure to warn, and negligence in
marketing.178 The consumers claimed that McDonald's promoted
frequent use of its products through advertising, despite knowing that
Further, the plaintiffs claimed
the products were dangerous.'
it
knew the dangers of fast food and
because
was
negligent
McDonald's
did not properly disseminate this information to the general public.1 80
The District Court in New York dismissed the case, based on rationales
of personal responsibility and common knowledge of the dangers of fast
food. 8 ' Essentially, while the plaintiffs were able to establish that they
relied on McDonald's advertising in purchasing large amounts of its
products, they could not show that the consumption of McDonald's
products was the principal cause of the their health problems, or that the
McDonald's advertisements were "objectively deceptive."l82 On appeal,
1307.
174. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14. Sarah Taylor Roller et al., Obesity, Food Marketing
and Consumer Litigation: Threat or Opportunity?, 61 FOOD DRUG L.J. 419, 443 (2006)
("Consumers cannot prevent diet-related disorders solely by avoiding particular food
products."). Some plaintiffs argue that restaurants should give warnings and instructions
adequate to inform consumers of the possible risks of eating fast food. Rothenberg, supra note
9, at 225.
175. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 203; Alyse Meislik, Note, Weighing in on the Scales of
Justice: The Obesity Epidemic and Litigation Against the Food Industry, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 78 1,
795 (2004) ("Thus, even though Pelman was unsuccessful in the courts, the lawsuit most likely
was a significant motivating force for McDonald's to offer its customers healthier dietary
choices").
176. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
177. Id. at 519.
178. Id. at 521.
179. Id. at 527-29.
180. Id. at 529.
181. Id. at 516, 543.
182. Donald R. Richardson, Note, "Want Fries With That?" A Critical Analysis of Fast
FoodLitigation, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 583 (2005).
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed the plaintiffs'
claims alleging deceptive representation of the nutrition benefits of
McDonald's food to proceed to trial, and remanded the case for further
proceedings to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove the causal
relationship between consumption of McDonald's food items and their
poor health.'8 3 Following the District Court's decision in Pelman,
numerous other plaintiffs tried to bring similar lawsuits, but none have
succeeded. 184
b. Parallels to Big Tobacco Litigation
Like Pelman and similar lawsuits, tobacco lawsuits also initially
failed in court. It was only after a movement in societal perception,
which "shifted public sentiment from a focus on personal responsibility
to a concentration on holding big tobacco responsible," did such
litigation ultimately succeed.18 Accordingly, it is possible, and indeed
many scholars think probable, that attitudes regarding fast food,
potential addictive properties of fast food,186 obesity as an illness, and
notions of corporate responsibility could shift and create a social and
legal environment that is more receptive to fast food tort litigation.
Before the risks of smoking, and the tobacco industry's knowledge
of such risk, were widely understood, the public generally objected to
183. Pelman, 396 F.3d at 508. Pelman is still active. In October 2010, the District Court
denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114247 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010).
184. See, e.g., Hoyte v. Yum Brands, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (2007) (Where a
physician brought a class action suit against Yum Brands, Inc., which owns KFC, alleging that
KFC failed to disclose the presence of transfat in its food and that KFC's statement that its food
could be part of a healthy lifestyle was negligent misrepresentation. The District Court found
that the physician failed to allege injury and the advertising claim was puffery.).
185. Novack, supra note 173, at 1313.
Just as tobacco companies had to help defray the health costs their products
created, fast food companies could be held liable in order to help pay for the
obesity epidemic their product helped create. Fast food companies may be
liable for creating this disease in people in the same way they would be liable if
they put addictive drugs in their food.
Id. at 1322. See generally Joshua Logan Pennel, Article, Big Food's Trip Down Tobacco Road:
What Tobacco's Past Can Indicate About Food's Future, 27 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 101
(2008).
186. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Can You Be Addicted to Foods?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/can-you-be-addicted-to-foods/?ref-health (explaining
that the type of high-sugar, fat, and salt laden foods served at fast food chains can actually
change brain chemistry and trigger a "neurological response that stimulates people to crave
more food, even if they're not hungry. The sense some people have that they cannot control
their intake may in fact be true"). See generally Jennifer Pomeranz et al., Innovative Legal
Approaches to Address Obesity, 87 MILBANK Q., 185, 195-97 (2009).
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holding cigarette companies liable for the "consequences of what was
seen as purely a personal choice."' 8 7 Similarly, some scholars seem
convinced that "fast food suits will almost certainly succeed at some
point" '
if deception by the food and beverage industry is
discovered, 189 and feel that "the history of tobacco litigation is the
future of the fast food industry."190 However, the comparison of obesity
to tobacco has a major limitation; cigarette smoking is an inherently
dangerous practice, while consumption of food is essential for life. Even
so, most fast food is arguably not inherently healthy either, and fast
food litigation certainly has the potential to increase in frequency and
legitimacy.
c. Federal Reaction to Fast Food Tort Lawsuits
As the incidence of obesity related lawsuits grew following Pelman,
a Senate subcommittee analyzed the need for tort reform in order to
protect restaurants and food companies from frivolous lawsuits claiming
that plaintiffs' obesity is the result of long term consumption of certain
types of food. 19 1 Such a strong government response may indicate, in
fact, that such lawsuits are not entirely frivolous.192 The Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005 (nicknamed the
"Cheeseburger Bill") was proposed to prevent civil liability actions
brought against food manufacturers, marketers, distributors, advertisers,
sellers and trade associations for claims of injury relating to "a person's
weight gain, obesity or any health condition associated with weight gain
or obesity." 93 Although the federal bill failed to become law, restaurant
and food production companies lobbied states and donated millions of
dollars toward the development of similar state limits on fast food tort
suits.194 As of 2010, twenty-four states have passed legislation that limit
187. GOsTIN,supra note 121, at213.
188. Novack, supra note 173, at 1326.
189. For example, "manipulating sugar and fat content or portion size, targeting children,
or misleading the public." GosTIN, supra note 121, at 213.
190. Franklin E. Crawford, Fit for Its OrdinaryPurpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the
Implied WarrantyofMerchantability,63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1169 (2002).
191. S.908. Common Sense Consumption: Super-Sizing Versus Personal Responsibility:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
109th Cong. (2005).
192. Meislik, supra note 175, at 782. "[Tlhe food industry and the government behave as
though the obesity suits are not frivolous. As of August 2003, state lawmakers had filed more
than 140 bills aimed at obesity." Id.
193. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 206; H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005).
194. Melanie Warner, "The Food Industry Empire Strikes Back: Lobbying Effort to Shield
Companies from Court Action is Gaining Ground," N.Y. TIMES (July, 7 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/07/business/07food.html?scp=1 &sq-the%20food%20indu
stry/o20strikes%20back&st-cse ("[iun the 2002 and 2004 election cycles, the food and
restaurant industry gave a total of $5.5 million to politicians in the 20 states that have passed

2011]

CLOSING THE KITCHEN? DIGESTING THE IMPACT OFTHE FEDERAL MENU LABELING LAW

285

obesity liability by preventing individuals from suing restaurants, food
manufacturers and marketing firms for contributing to unhealthy eating,
weight gain and related health problems.' 95 Regardless of commonsense
consumption laws, tort claims based on grounds that products are
unreasonably dangerous, and a reasonable alternative design exists, may
still be viable.' 9 6
d. Section 4205 and Potential Preemption of State Fast Food
Tort Suits
Section 4205 does not include any language that specifically
addresses its impact on potential state tort lawsuits, but does note that it
shall not be construed to preempt any provision of state or local law,
except regarding covered disclosures. There are many cases that address
the question of interpreting federal statutes that do not specifically
address potential preemption of state common law suits.19 In some
cases, the Supreme Court has held that federal law can preempt state
lawsuits. The Court has been willing to assert federal authority in areas
of regulation traditionally reserved for the states, such as products
liability and state tort law. 198 However, in preemption cases, the
Supreme Court has noted "'and particularly in those in which Congress
has legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,' . . . we start with the assumption that the historic police

powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 99
laws shielding companies from obesity liability.").
195. LEVI ET AL., supra note 7, at 47. ("Twenty-four states have passed obesity liability
laws: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming."). Interestingly,
Georgia, for example, both limits obesity liability and before the enactment of the ACA also
passed a law to prevent state and local menu disclosures. In effect, Georgia did not allow
consumers to gain access to information, nor bring lawsuits, thus eviscerating consumer
protection to a large degree. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-373(a) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2432 (2011).
196. GOSTIN,supra note 121, at 114.
197. However, some statutes have express preemption provisions. For example, courts
have held that the express preemption provision in the NLEA explicitly preempts certain state
laws that address specific subjects covered under the NLEA and the FDCA. John B. Reiss et al.,
Your Business in Court: 2008-2009, 64 FOOD DRUG L.J. 755, 797 (2009). For a recent
discussion of labeling regulation and preemption, see Holk v. Snapple Bev. Corp., 575 F.3d 329,
339, 342 (3d Cir. N.J. 2009).
198. Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Common Law Court of the United States, 18 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 119, 152, 154 (2008).
199. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (2006) (in turn quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The most recent Supreme Court decisions that are applicable to the
question of preemption in food labeling addressed preemption in the
field of medical device and drug labeling. In 2007, the Supreme Court
held in Riegel v. Medtronic that Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device
Amendments to FDCA preempts state law claims seeking damages for
injuries caused by medical devices that received premarket approval
from the FDA.20 0 In Riegel, Justice Scalia noted the ineffective nature of
the tort system because juries do not engage in cost-benefit analysis.201
Further, state tort law that would require devices to be safer, but less
effective than the FDA's model, "disrupts the federal scheme."2 02 A
similar argument could be applied to § 4205, specifically that common
law tort suits may be an ineffective approach to nutrient regulation.
However, premarket approval of medical devices is an arduous and
thorough process that weighs benefits and risks, while menu labels
simply present information. Thus, the application of Riegel's holding to
§ 4205 is tenuous, at best.
Two years later, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court found that a
FDA label approval for a warning label on a drug product did not
preempt state laws and shield the manufacturer from damages. 20 3 The
Court differentiated Wyeth from Riegel because:
[i]f Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its
objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption
provision at some point during the FDCA's 70-year history. But
despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption provision
for medical devices . . . Congress has not enacted such a

provision for prescription drugs.204
Similarly, Congress declined to enact such a provision for menu
labeling when it designed § 4205. Moreover, the Court rejected the
argument that requiring drug manufactures to "comply with a state-law
duty to provide a stronger warning ... would obstruct the purposes and
objectives of federal drug labeling regulation" as an "overbroad view of
an agency's power to preempt state law." 205 Such reasoning can also be
extrapolated to the additional layer of safety resulting from common
200. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
201. Id. at 325 (2008).
202. Id.
203. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (In this case, there was evidence that Congress did not intend
for the FDA to be the only avenue for ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.). The Vermont
Supreme Court held that "Plaintiffs negligence and product-liability claims fall squarely within
the scope of traditional state regulations, so it is appropriate to apply the presumption against
preemption here." Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 187 (Vt. 2006).
204. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
205. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1190.
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law tort suits.
As the Supreme Court continues to refine its analysis of preemption
cases,206 it is unclear how courts will interpret the scope of § 4205,
which is silent regarding state common law tort suits. Courts will likely
find that Congress has not regulated the entire field of menu labeling in
§ 4205, and there is room left for states to consider tort actions. After
Riegel and Wyeth it appears that congressional intent will be the
"touchstone" used to determine the existence of both implied and
207
express preemption under the FDCA. Accordingly, § 4205 will likely
not be read to preempt state common law because there is no express
congressional intent that it should preempt state common law tort suits.
Simple compliance with a regulatory scheme not intended to provide
safety measures should not necessarily be seen as a source of
immunity. 208 In addition, the menu label mandated by § 4205 simply
provides information, but does not assert to guarantee a level of safety.
Calorie labels present information and do not make claims or warnings
about consumption, while warning statements make a clear claim or
provide explicit instructions regarding safety. Further, because § 4205
reflects a compromise with large businesses (in that they will not be
subject to a patchwork of local and state regulation), Congress's
declination to include any language referring to protection of state tort
lawsuits may, in fact, further imply that such lawsuits are not
preempted.
Finally, state tort law has historically been a question for state
judicial systems. In addition to being a state law issue, preserving the
ability of plaintiffs to bring tort suits will help to ensure continuing
consumer protection and safety by bringig to light otherwise hidden
information, offsetting weak regulation,2 0 raising awareness about
issues, stimulating fruitful dialogue, and potentially compelling
innovation and reform in food policy, particularly where increased
regulations are not available. 210

206. Lainie Rutkow et al., Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu
Labeling Laws and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 772
(2008).
207. Reiss et al., supra note 197, at 789.
208. O'REILLY, supra note 139, at 88 ("compliance with regulatory norms is usually a
minimum, not a source of immunity from liability").
209. William Funk et al., The Truth about Torts: Using Agency Preemption to Undercut
Consumer Health and Safety, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, Sept. 2007, available at

http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/TruthTorts 704.pdf.
210. GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 430. For example, in 2003, BanTransFat.com
filed a lawsuit against Kraft, alleging that Oreos contain trans-fats, which are not safe for
consumption. The plaintiffs ultimately dropped the lawsuit when Kraft announced an overhaul
of its food products as a result of the public attention the case created. Meislik, supra note 175,
at 792.
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4. Section 4205 is Vulnerable to Creating a Regulatory Freeze That
Does Not Tailor Interventions to Fit Community Needs
The uniform ceiling created by § 4205 is inherently vulnerable to
creating a regulatory freeze, both federally and locally. 2 1 1 The statute
does not reward nor require the FDA to reexamine, reassess, and
improve upon past regulations and actions.212 Because agencies must
balance limited resources, the FDA could very well focus on more
immediate crises rather than act to improve or reexamine § 4205 .213
In addition, many public health problems, including obesity, are not
distributed uniformly across the United States; obesity challenges may
differ between urban and rural populations, different ethnicities, and
other factors.214 Some scholars argue that centralized solutions often fail
because such approaches cannot account for "the wide variation in
circumstances among individuals, ranging from differences in genetics
to environmental factors." 215 Thus, the ceiling preemption in § 4205
essentially erases the possibility of tailoring local interventions to
specific community needs. Practically, it is less likely § 4205 would
have been passed as an explicit floor due to strong business interests in
havin a uniform federal policy that capitalizes on economies of
scale. 6 However, it is important to recognize the likely reduction in, or
abolishment of, innovation that will result.
Because states can now only regulate smaller establishments that
still retain the option to opt in to the federal scheme, there will be little,
if any, incentive for states and localities to use legislative resources to
enact new policies because the number of restaurants subject to new
state and local regulations will be drastically reduced, and such
establishments can choose to opt out by complying with § 4205.
Already, in Montgomery County, Washington, county executives have
decided to delay enforcement of a local menu labeling regulation,
explaining that "the most prudent course of action is to proceed with
enforcing the components of county law that are identical to [§ 4205]
211. Preemption can be express or implied. Mermin, supra note 131. Section 4205
contains an express preemption clause. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 4205(b)
(to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5) (H)).
212. Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1593.
213. Id. at 1593-94.
214. Rutkow et al., supra note 206, at 773.
215. GOSTIN, supra note 121, at 501. An example of a community-specific solution to
obesity is zoning. South Los Angeles has high rates of obesity and poverty compared to
surrounding neighborhoods, so the City Council effectively banned new fast food restaurants in
that area. Jennifer Medina, In South Los Angeles, New Fast Food Spots Get A 'No, Thanks,'
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/us/16fastfood.html?_r-3
&src=twrhp&source=govdelivery.
216. For example, national franchises may produce one type of menu board, but different
state or local regulations on top of a national floor might necessitate custom boards.
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and delay those components of county law that the FDA will address in
The same holds true in New Jersey, where
federal regulations."
Governor Jon Corzine signed a calorie disclosure law that has not yet
been implemented.2 1 8 Health and Senior Services Department
spokeswoman Donna Leusner announced "[i]nstead of confusing
businesses and the public with two sets of rules, the department is trying
to be business-friendly by at least waiting to see what the FDA proposes

in March." 2 19
Thus, the effect of § 4205 will be a reliance on a static status quo,
both federally and locally, without substantial encouragement for
experimentation with different policy choices. 220 Given that obesity is a
complex challenge and important public health issue, such a regulatory
freeze is a poor long-term strategy. Many critics argue that current antiobesity policies are not effective, so stifling innovation could lead to
even more chronic illness and higher taxpayer costs. It is impossible to
predict how the fight against obesity will take shape, and § 4205 engulfs
an entire sphere of disclosure without leaving room to grow and change
to best incorporate new research and innovative approaches to
combating obesity through nutrient disclosure.
5. Section 4205 Presents Additional Inconsistencies and Implementation
Challenges of Note
In addition to inconsistencies regarding businesses with under 20
establishments, silence regarding state tort lawsuits, and the potential to
create a regulatory freeze, § 4205 presents other inconsistencies and
implementation challenges. Namely, the FDA has been charged with
promulgating regulations for and implementing § 4205 but it is not yet
clear how the FDA will interpret all parts of § 4205, or how much
flexibility the FDA will leave to the states and business.
a. Regulation and Enforcement
It is unclear how § 4205 will be regulated and enforced, and how
217. Brian Hughes, Montgomery Scales Back Menu Labeling, WASH. ExAMINER, Dec. 22,
2010, http://washingtonexaminer.com/blogs/capital-land/2010/12/montgomery-scales-back-me
nu-labeling.
218. Susan K. Livio, State Isn't Embracing New Menu Label Law, NoRTH JERSEY.COM,
Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.northjersey.con/news/health/nutrition/l14259754_State isn t em
bracing_new menu_ label-law.html.
219. Id. The FDA released proposed rules in April of2011, but final rules are not expected
to be implemented until 2012.
220. The status quo bias is a phenomenon where "individuals will generally oppose
change." Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1608.
221. GosTIN, supra note 121, at 501.
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much variance in calorie content between what is posted on menus and
what is actually in food samples will be acceptable.2 22 A 2010 study by
Tufts University researchers found that where calorie content of menu
items was disclosed in restaurants, the actual calories varied
significantly from the posted calories, and in many instances averaged
18% higher than the stated values, with some items containing over
200% more calories than stated. 223
The FDA has not indicated if they will contract with state and local
public health departments to enforce the statute, or if it will regulate
restaurants and vending machines itself and in either case, where the
funding will come from. The FDA should consider how to control for
variation in compliance and inspection procedure. Some scholars
question whether the FDA is even competent to implement and enforce
menu-labeling requirements.224 State and local health departments may
be more adept, as they "likely have preexisting relationships with local
restaurateurs via enforcement of other state and local food safety and
health code regulations." 225 Further, state and local agencies often have
greater knowledge of local problems and more direct political
accountability, as well as the ability to meet diverse needs. 226
Because the FDA has not yet indicated the enforcement structure of
label
§ 4205, states and locales may consider enacting their own menu 227
laws that are operationally identical to the final federal regulations. A
parallel law would likely give the states and localities authority
necessary to enforce the disclosure requirements at a local level. The
fact that § 4205 leaves some regulatory room available for state and
local governments to regulate establishments with less than twenty
locations shows some intent of Congress to leave some power with
states and localities to police the regulatory scheme. 228
222. For example, California's law directs local inspectors to check menu labels requires
fines for infractions. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West 2009).
223. Lorien E. Urban et al., The Accuracy of State Energy Contents of Reduced-Energy,
Commercially PreparedFoods, 110 J. OF THE AM. DIETETIC Ass'N 116, 116-23 (2010).
224. See supra note 156.
225. Banker, supra note 60, at 928. However, the FDA has administered the NLEA for
almost twenty years, although the NLEA explicitly exempts restaurants. Id.
226. GOsTIN, supra note 121, at 79; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT:
FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 123 (2008) ("[T]there are significant differences between
the needs in Manhattan as compared to, say, rural Mississippi.").
227. "'Not identical to' does not refer to the specific words in the requirement but instead
means that the State requirement directly or indirectly imposes obligations . . . [that] Differ from
those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable provision (including any
implementing regulation)." 21 C.F.R. 100. 1(c)(4).
228. If states and localities do not take such steps, they may face an effective vacuum of
null preemption in the face of inaction. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1015, 1021 (2010) ("In essence, null preemption arises where two things
happen: (1) the federal government establishes a "zero level" of federal regulation, and (2) the
federal government preempts the states from filling the regulatory void.").
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Moreover, it is unclear which, if any, individuals will have standing
to bring lawsuits against restaurants for noncompliance and what such
penalties might be. 2 Thus, the preemptive reach of § 4205 in the name
of national uniformity may lead to implementation challenges as the
FDA attempts to regulate an area that has traditionally been reserved for
the states. The FDA should be sure to address these issues when
releasing additional guidance documents and final rules.
b. Contextual Calorie Number on Menus
Section 4205 mandates the presentation of "a succinct statement
concerning suggested daily calorie intake . . . designed to enable the

public to understand, in the context of a total daily diet, the significance
of the nutrition information that is provided" on menu boards so
consumers will be able to compare totals for individual food items to
suggested daily consumption. 30 The FDA is charged with the
responsibility of determining this number.2 3 1 In proposed rules, the FDA
"tentatively concludes that 2,000 calories is an appropriate reference
value to include in the succinct statement," but should be presented in a
way that serves to "inform consumers that individual needs vary." 232
While presenting a contextual calorie number is a promising idea,
one number is not a sufficient guide for all people. Sex, weight, activity
level, and other factors all contribute to how many calories an
individual should consume daily. 2 3 3 The 2010 U.S. Dietary Guidelines
Report lists target calorie ranges for children and adults that range from
1000 to 3000 calories per day.234 Accordingly, this part of § 4205
requires a more thoughtful application that accounts for discrepancies in
average intake between people and also for children. Some possibilities
are to present daily calorie ranges, averages for different ages, sexes,
and weights, or including a different number for children.

229. Further, there is the possibility that mislabeling could be a topic of interest for
industrious litigators. Green, supra note 37, at 770. For example, two Kentucky women recently
filed a lawsuit against Applebee's Restaurants for lying about fat and calorie content of certain
menu items (which was voluntarily posted), seeking damages for consuming food that was more
calorie and unhealthy than represented. Ashlee Clark, Florence Women Sue Applebee's, Weight
Watchers, Sept. 7, 2009, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, http://www.kentucky.com/2009/09/07/

924591/florence-women-sue-applebees-weight.html#more.
230. Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
343(q)(5)(H).
231. Id.
232. ProposedRules, supra note 79.

§ 4205 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §

233. 7 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE & U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.
DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 26 (2010).

234. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

292

[Vol. 22

IV. MENU OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Section 4205 is a progressive policy rightly aimed at preventing and
reducing obesity, but the passage of § 4205 may have been premature
and incorrectly designed. Given the range of implementation
inconsistencies, challenges, and potential consequences discussed in
Parts I through III, it is vital for policymakers to reconsider the language
and interpretation of § 4205, particularly following the FDA's issuance
of final regulations.
A. Rewrite § 4205 as a Uniform National Floor
The strongest approach to preserving state influence that fosters
experimentalism and tailors innovation to community needs would be to
rewrite § 4205 as a uniform national floor, instead of ceiling. The
purpose of uniformity underlying the current federal law does not
sufficiently justify the displacement of state and local authority in
combating the obesity epidemic. As a floor, § 4205 would serve as a
minimum standard for nutrient disclosure for establishments with more
than twenty locations, but would not preempt states and localities from
enacting additional regulations. States and localities could enact their
own requirements in addition to § 4205's minimum rules.
To change § 4205 into a floor, 21 U.S.C.S. § 343-1 would require
amendment. § 343-1(a)(3) would have to be amended to remove
§ 343(h), which is the menu labeling section. Such an amendment to
§ 343-1(a) might read as follows:
[n]o State or political subdivision of a State may directly or
indirectly establish under any authority or continue in effect as to
any food in interstate commerce any requirement that requires
less disclosure for the labeling of food of the type required by
section 403(h). States or political subdivisions of a State may,
however, enact requirements in addition to those required by
403(h). Establishments not covered by 403(h) may still
voluntarily comply with the requirements of 403(h), but are not
excluded from any additional state or local requirements.
Further, the amended law could incorporate language from the MEAL
Act: "[n]othing in this clause precludes a State or political subdivision
of a State from requiring that a restaurant or similar food establishment
provide nutrition information in addition to that required under this
clause." 235
Ideally, rewriting § 4205 as a floor would result in a shift from
235.

S 2784; HR 3895.
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command and control regulation to cooperative federalism where states
and localities have the flexibility to adapt laws to new scientific
evidence and practices regarding obesity control and nutrient disclosure.
This solution is more effective than simply stripping away § 4205
altogether because a minimum standard will mandate some disclosure in
states that would not otherwise pass such laws; this solution may also
encourage supplementary state innovation and empirical research.2 3 6
While businesses would have to concede a degree of uniformity unless
they choose to adopt the strictest local requirements and implemented
them nationally, the public health implications of fostering
experimentalism in the sphere of disclosure will likely outweigh any
negative impacts on businesses. Floor preemption preserves state roles
and permits mutual learning,237 providing a better chance of success and
meeting long-term public health obesity reduction goals as calorie
disclosure and other interventions become better understood with
additional research.
Specifically, a floor preemption scheme would address many of the
problems and inconsistencies outlined in Section III. For instance, states
and localities would be able to more effectively combat obesity and
promote health by requiring additional disclosure of food composition
on menus, such as sodium and trans-fat content. 23 8 Small businesses
would be more likely to bear equal responsibility for America's weight
crisis because they would not be able to opt in to § 4205 to avoid stricter
regulation, and the chances of encountering a regulatory freeze would
be dramatically reduced. Further, states would have more control over
enforcement and compliance, without having to wait for the FDA to
decide on final regulations or an enforcement structure. Moreover,
states would be able to control the presentation of a contextual calorie
number, and could elect to present multiple numbers that more
accurately reflect different calorie needs of the local population. 239
Ultimately, public health challenges are constantly evolving; it is not
possible to predict what the next great public health problem may be
and we do not want to keep the laboratories of democracy from being
able to solve it.
Alternatively, policymakers could consider modifying § 4205,
instead of completely rewriting it, to include restaurants and vending
machines with less than 20 locations, such as establishments with 15 or
more locations (which many state and local laws do).24 0 While it is
236.

See supra text accompanying note 1334.

237. Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1586.
238. Pomeranz, supranote 53.
239. See supra note 235.
240.

See, e.g., N.Y. HEALTH CODE LAw

§ 81.50

(2008).
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possible that such an approach could further decrease incentives for
states to propose new regulations for small chains and local restaurants,
public health officials would have to consider that potential tradeoff
compared to including more restaurants in the disclosure requirements,
and thus informing more consumers.
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that Congress will rewrite or
materially modify § 4205 in the immediate future because of the
attention that was recently given to the issue and Congress's long
agenda in other areas of regulation, such as healthcare reform. While
state suits contesting the constitutionality of sections of the ACA may
change the law, § 4205 is not one of the highly contested sections of the
ACA, and it unlikely that the ACA in its entirety will be struck down.
Additionally, as menu labeling becomes ubiquitous and nutrient
composition databases and software for labeling become more
available, estimation of calorie content in menu offerings will become
less onerous and will not always require direct chemical analysis, thus
reducing costs of calorie content calculation.241 Congress should be
prepared to revisit § 4205 as technology develops.
B. ConsiderationsFor§ 4205 in its Existing Form
Given the political and procedural difficulties inherent to changing
§ 4205 in the near future, it is important for agencies and policymakers
at all levels of government to be prepared to work with § 4205 in its
existing form. First, the FDA should use its agency power to
immediately clarify uncertainties in § 4205, and implement the statute
with broad latitude in an effort to preserve as much state innovation as
possible that still preserve § 4205's statutory goals. For instance, the
FDA should consider a wide definition for covered entities that includes
more businesses, such as movie theaters and sports parks, whose
primary business interests are not serving food, thus making nutritional
information more widely available. 242
Second, the FDA should liberally grant preemption exemption
petitions as discussed in Part 111.243 In addition to granting petitions to
localities that previously enacted menu labeling regulations before the
passage of the ACA, the FDA should consider granting additional
prospective exemptions in order to foster a degree of controlled,
241. Richard A. Williams et al., Counting Calories: Report of the Working Group on
Obesity, Office of Scientific Analysis and Support, Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition, In support of the Obesity Working Group, FDA (Dec. 2003), http://www.fda.gov/
Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/ucm081998.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2001).
242. For instance, a large popcorn from Regal Cinemas is 1200 calories. Sarah Gilbert,
Movie Theatres Not Happy with Popcorn Calorie Report, WALLET POP, Mar. 30, 2011,
http://www.walletpop.com/2011/03/30/movie-theaters-not-happy-with-popcom-calorie-report/.
243. See 21 U.S.C. §343-1(b) (2010).
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permissive experimentation. The Code of Federal Regulations describes
the requirements and process for obtaining an exemption, providing that
states and localities may apply for an exemption "where a State
requirement has been preempted." 244 This language could be construed
as not only applying to nutrition labeling legislation that was enacted
before passage of the ACA, but also to legislation enacted after passage
of the ACA. In that case, state and localities could try to request
exemptions for regulations that were proposed but not implemented
prior to the enactment of the ACA. Of course, granting any such
exemptions would effectively read out the express preemption clause in
§ 4205, but this may be an area where the FDA has some latitude to
permit certain localities to experiment with additional regulations.
Further, the FDA should consider granting future exemption petitions
for states and localities that have not yet enacted their own laws, in
order to continue to promote experimentalism and innovation tailored to
meet community needs. For example, the FDA could more liberally
grant exemptions in communities with specific health problems that
could be targeted with additional disclosure rules, such as sodium
disclosure on menus in localities where high blood pressure is prevalent,
evaluated against a rational basis review standard.
C. State andPrivate Optionsfor Obesity Reduction
Outside of§ 4205
Private actors and government agencies should promote and fund
anti-obesity and healthy living campaigns in order to avoid a frozen
initial effort at combating obesity through consumer choice at
restaurants. For instance, campaigns targeting certain populations who
may not understand how to interpret calorie postings and contextual
calorie numbers could be useful. Other campaigns could raise
awareness regarding the ability of customers to request pamphlets with
fat, sodium content, and other disclosures at restaurants covered under §
4205.
As discussed in Part II, federal law does not preclude state and local
requirements regarding warning or safety statements. However, federal
law does not allow states and localities to require restaurants to make
health claims (e.g., "low in sodium"), and if restaurants choose to make
such claims, the NLEA requires them to comply with FDA
regulations. 2 45 Thus, it is still possible for lawmakers or agencies to
provide a mandate for the dissemination of additional health
information at restaurants that do not make health claims about
244.
245.

21 C.F.R. 100.1.
Rutkow et al., supra note 206, at 780-81.
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particular items. 24 6 For example, lawmakers could consider requiring
restaurants and other establishments to post signs about the benefits of
healthy eating, and what to consume as part of a healthy diet. In
addition, the NLEA contains an exception that allows localities to enact
laws that regulate restaurants' ability to regulate claims about nutrients
the FDA finds to be "associated with [an] increased disease or healthrelated condition risk," such as cholesterol and saturated fat. 247
Localities could promulgate requirements that are responsive to
community needs; for example, in areas that are plagued with
hypertension, lawmakers could require food establishments to hang
signs or provide information about sodium reduction.
Grants promoting state and local development of new policies for
single restaurants or very small chains not covered by § 4205 would be
useful to prevent an effective regulatory freeze.248 For many single unit
businesses or small chains, even the moderate cost of calculating
nutrients in menu items may be prohibitive and prevent restaurants that
would like to voluntarily display such information from doing so. For
example, some localities are paying for nutrition information
calculations for small, local restaurants that will not fall under the
jurisdiction of § 4205.249 Further, more research should be done
continually to analyze the impact and effectiveness of § 4205 and to
and
develop sugestions for implementation, enforcement,
improvement.
Finally, courts should be mindful of not blocking common law tort
suits, to the extent the law allows this. As discussed in Part III, retention
of common law liability can serve as a safety valve and prompt
improvements in federal law. Accordingly, § 4205 should not be read as
a federal disclosure regime that in turn insulates businesses from
potential state common law tort suits. State tort law can function as a
246. The Center for Science in the Public Interest has petitioned the FDA to require
warning labels on containers of carbonated drinks that state that drinking non-diet soft drinks
may contribute to weight gain and thus increase risks of chronic illness. Rothenberg, supra note
9, at 195.
247. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(B).
248. For example, the Burgerville chain prints "the total calories of your order on the
receipt, as well as information on fat, fiber and carbohydrate content." Katherine Hobson,
Here's Your Burger and Your Change, and By The Way, That's 1,213 Calories, WALL ST. J.
HEALTH BLOG (May 18, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/05/18/heres-your-change-andby-the-way-thats-12 13-calories.
249. See Charity Vogel, Initiative Will Put Nutrition Facts on Local Menus: Program
Aims to Improve Health of Region's Diners, BUFFALO NEWS (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article245402.ece (200 locally owned restaurants in Erie
County, New York will be given access to a program called Menu-Calc through a state grant in
an effort to make restaurants healthier for consumers by supplying nutrition information for
certain food items).
250. For an additional discussion of innovative approaches to combating obesity, see
Pomeranz et al., supra note 186, at 185.
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feedback loop, which is particularly important given the ceiling
preemption function of § 4205. 251 Many advocates argue that apart from
of the outcome of the lawsuits, such suits and future threats of lawsuits
are a tool of social reform that have compelled the food industry to
market healthier foods. 252 Furthermore, preemption of tort lawsuits
would shift the burden of compensation for injuries from the
responsible parties to the victim, taxpayers, and society in general.2 53
Accordingly, regardless of the merits and consequences of tort
litigation, § 4205 should not be read to preempt state common law tort
suits, which are ultimately questions for the state judicial system.
CONCLUSION

Obesity is a significant, costly and growing public health problem
that demands a multi-layered government response. The law is a
powerful tool for influencing behavior and having a meaningful impact
on the public's health. As one approach to combating the obesity
epidemic, a federal uniform standard of menu labeling is a positive step,
although it is a contested policy, with mixed empirical results at the
local level to date. Given the ever-changing landscape of American
health, it is vital not to suppress experimentalism and innovation. As
with many public health challenges, menu labeling policy poses a
tradeoff. On one hand, a federal uniform standard will impact a greater
number of people but does not encourage states to find more successful
solutions. Conversely, a patchwork approach without any federal
standard or floor may not widely address the disclosure issue, and
would leave some areas without requirements of any sort.
Ideally, § 4205 should be re-written as a national floor that allows
states to experiment with new disclosure requirements, or at least be
interpreted broadly by the FDA and courts, with a sound understanding
of the benefits of state and local regulation and input. Finally, it is
important to remember that a multitude of factors contribute to the
obesity epidemic, and menu labeling alone may not be effective.
Ultimately, more research needs to be done to understand the public
health impacts of menu labeling, and further investigate new and
innovative approaches to trimming America's waistline.

251.
252.
253.

Buzbee, supra note 123, at 1583.
Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 203.
William Funk et al., The Truth About Torts: Using Agency Preemption to Undercut

Consumer Health and Safety, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Sept. 2007), http://www.

progressiveregulation.org/articles/TruthTorts 704.pdf.
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